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Abstract—This paper presents a method to simultaneously 
improve the quality of the identifiers, secret keys, and random 
numbers that can be generated from the start-up values of 
standard Static Random Access Memories, SRAMs. The method 
is based on classifying memory cells after evaluating their startup 
values at multiple measurements in a registration phase. The 
registration can be done without unplugging the device from its 
application context, and with no need for a complex laboratory 
setup. The method has been validated experimentally with 
standard low-power SRAM modules in two different Application 
Specific Integrated Circuits, ASICs, fabricated with 90-nm 
TSMC technology. The results show that with a simple 
registration the length of the identifiers can be reduced by 45%, 
worst-case bit error probability (which defines the complexity of 
the error correcting code needed to recover a secret key) can be 
reduced by 64%, and the worst-case minimum entropy value is 
improved, thus reducing the number of bits that have to be 
processed to obtain full entropy by 81%. The method can be 
applied to standard digital designs by controlling the external 
power supply to the SRAM using software or by incorporating 
simple circuitry in the design. In the latter case, a module for 
implementing the method in an ASIC designed in 90-nm TSMC 
technology occupies an active area of 42,025 μm2. 
 




TATIC memory cells have two stable states. They store 
the logic ‘0’ or ‘1’ that is written in them when they are 
powered up, and lose information when they are powered 
down. If they are powered up and no data is written, they 
reach logic ‘0’ or ‘1’ in a way that can be difficult to predict, 
to model mathematically, and to clone physically, making 
them behave as Physical Unclonable Functions, PUFs. It has 
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been observed that many of the memory cells in a memory 
reach the same start-up values every time that memory is 
powered up and that those values are not the same as the start-
up values reached by the cells of other memories [1]-[10]. 
This property has been exploited to construct identifiers (IDs) 
which cannot be generated by counterfeit memories and are 
more difficult to copy because they are generated on the fly 
rather than being stored. Static memory cells consist of cross-
coupled circuits with latches, flip-flops, NOR gates, inverters, 
etc. Cells based on cross-coupled latches [1] and flip-flops [2] 
have been employed to identify FPGAs. In [3], cells based on 
NOR gates were specifically designed to identify ASICs. The 
memory cells of SRAMs, which consist of cross-coupled 
inverters, were first proposed in [4] to identify integrated 
circuit wafers and dies and were later studied by many authors 
[5]-[10]. This paper focuses on exploiting the standard 
SRAMs available in many digital circuits for security 
purposes. 
Ideally, the two inverters of the SRAM cells should be as 
identical as possible, since this improves the power and speed 
characteristics of the memory. However, mismatching 
produced by fabrication process variability is unavoidable and 
the two inverters will therefore hardly ever behave in the same 
way. If the cell is started-up and no value is written, any minor 
difference between the inverters will cause one of them to start 
conducting before the other. Due to the amplifying effect of 
each inverter acting on the output of the other, this will bias, 
or skew the cell towards ’0’ or ’1’. The work in [5] classifies 
cells into two basic types: “skewed cells”, displaying high 
degree of bias and therefore more likely to evolve to one of 
the stable states, and “neutral cells” that do not have a strong 
tendency to any state. 
The big problem when generating identifiers and secret 
keys is that neutral cells change their start-up value from one 
generation to another. This is known as the bit flipping 
problem [6]-[12]. In identification applications, some bit 
flipping is allowable provided that the identifiers generated by 
genuine and fake memories are sufficiently different. 
However, cryptographic keys cannot vary from one realization 
to another (if they could, it would be impossible to encode 
and/or authenticate messages correctly). Bit flipping must 
therefore be removed completely to construct secrets from 
SRAM responses. For this purpose, Helper Data Algorithms 
(HDAs) - in particular Code Offset-based HDAs as described 
in [13] - have been employed. The drawback to this solution is 
the use of heavy error correction codes (ECCs) [6], [7]. As 
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reported in [7], [9], the percentage of cells showing bit 
flipping increases if there are variations in the power supply 
voltage and increases even more if there are variations in the 
operating temperature. 
Many techniques have been reported aimed at minimizing 
bit flipping. Some of them resort to the full custom VLSI 
design of memory cells [14]-[15]. In [14], NMOS write 
drivers and PMOS switches are added to the memory cells 
while in [15] circuitry is included to add an additional voltage 
source at the gate of one of the NMOS transistors in the 
memory cell and evaluate whether the threshold voltage 
mismatch between the NMOS transistors exceeds a carefully 
pre-established threshold. In any case, such approaches are 
more costly than using standard SRAM cells. The problem of 
using standard SRAM cells is that the influence of temperature 
and power supply voltage on the final start-up values is 
difficult to model, although some interesting studies have been 
carried out in this regard (see [16]). Several authors have 
proposed experimentally characterizing the behavior of the 
start-up values at multiple environmental temperatures (at 
least three temperatures), by using a temperature chamber or a 
temperature forcing system to control the operating 
temperature of the memory [17], [18]. As an alternative to this 
exhaustive characterization of many operating conditions, [12] 
proposed verifying two corner conditions (high-temperature 
low-power-supply-voltage and low-temperature low-power-
supply-voltage), together with a neighborhood analysis within 
a memory word to select the most suitable cells for generating 
identifiers or keys. However, those corner conditions are not 
common to all SRAMs and neighborhood influence also 
depends on the particular SRAM in question (for example, 
strong location-based correlations are reported in [19] but not 
in other works). Furthermore, startup values are influenced not 
only by the final supply voltage value but also by the voltage 
ramp-up time (i.e., the time it takes to reach the operational 
supply voltage after power-on) [9]. The work in [20] therefore 
proposed characterizing the SRAM in terms both of power 
supply ramp-up times and temperatures using the appropriate 
laboratory equipment in a registration phase and then 
matching the ramp-up time to the ambient temperature when 
the start-up values are needed (this can be implemented using 
a voltage ramp-up regulator, an embedded temperature sensor, 
an analog to digital converter and a controller). To reduce the 
percentage of bit flipping, the work in [11] analyzed three 
reliability enhancing techniques: directed accelerated aging, 
activation control (which controls the power supply waveform 
shape, in particular the ramp-up time), and multiple 
evaluations under nominal operating conditions to generate a 
“soft” version of the SRAM startup values (the multiple 
evaluations can then be combined using majority vote or 
saturating arithmetic to form the final “hard” response). The 
best results were obtained using the last technique, and it is 
therefore this technique that this paper explores in greater 
depth. 
All the above mentioned works focus on improving the 
generation of identifiers or secret keys but they do not propose 
anything regarding random numbers. It must be remembered 
that while skewed cells are the most suitable for generating 
reliable identifiers and secret keys, they should not be used to 
generate sequences of random numbers because their start-up 
values are repeated over and over again. In contrast, neutral 
cells, which should not be used to generate identifiers and 
secret keys, are the best cells for generating random numbers. 
The metastability of cross-coupled circuits has been widely 
exploited to produce true random number generators 
(TRNGs). The earliest solutions, which were based on latches 
and flip-flops, appeared in [21], [22]. SRAM start-up values 
were first used as a source of entropy in [5]. Since the entropy 
provided by standard SRAMs is not very high (because they 
have many skewed cells), the works in [5] and [23] used a 
hash function to condense many bits into a much shorter bit 
string, ensuring full entropy. As in the case of identifiers or 
secret keys, some techniques have also resorted to the full 
custom VLSI design of memory cells to generate random 
numbers, although for this purpose the design objective is just 
the opposite: to hold the cell at the metastable point or to 
evaluate the quality of the cell metastability [22], [24]. In [22], 
a negative feedback loop implemented with a switched 
capacitor network is employed. In [24] additional circuitry 
included a completion detector, a time-to-digital converter, 
and a control system employing statistical information from a 
set of measurement samples. The work in [25] proposed the 
inclusion of digital signal processing circuitry to implement 8 
NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) tests 
suitable for evaluating the quality of the random numbers as 
they are generated. All these approaches focus on improving 
the generation of random numbers, but do not propose 
anything regarding identifiers and secret keys. 
The method presented in this paper offers a good tradeoff 
between implementation cost and improvements in the 
generation of identifiers, secret keys and random numbers - 
security primitives required by many cryptographic 
applications. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no other 
method has been proposed to improve the generation of all 
these primitives simultaneously. The idea is to classify the 
memory cells of the standard SRAMs available in many 
digital designs into two disjoint sets, one suitable for 
generating identifiers or secret keys, and the other suitable for 
generating random numbers. No complex laboratory setup is 
required for such classification. The method can be 
implemented easily with the memory embedded in its 
application context, either by adding simple circuitry to the 
digital design or by executing simple software. It does not 
need to be implemented by specialized vendors, or in the 
factory where the memory is manufactured. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section II describes the 
methodology used to characterize SRAMs, defining the 
performance metrics and the evaluation strategy followed. 
Section III contains experimental results for reliability and 
entropy obtained from standard TSMC 90-nm SRAMs 
included in two different ASICs. The results obtained with and 
without classifying the cells are compared and discussed to 
support the choice of the proposed method. Section IV 
describes how the method is applied and uses experimental 
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results to validate the advantages of its application to generate 
identifiers, secret keys, and random numbers. A VLSI module 
was designed in TSMC 90-nm technology to illustrate, 
together with the SRAMs analyzed, how an ASIC with 
embedded SRAMs can incorporate the method. The 
advantages of the method for countering aging are 
summarized at the end of Section IV. Finally, conclusions are 
given in Section V.  
II. METHODOLOGY TO CHARACTERIZE SRAMS 
A. Performance metrics 
1) Reliability 
The use of start-up values to identify SRAMs consists of two 
steps, registration and verification. In the registration step, 
response Ri resulting from the concatenation of the start-up 
values of n memory cells of the SRAM is stored as the 
template of that memory. In the verification stage, the start-up 
values of the n cells are again measured, obtaining response 
Rj. Ideally, the responses should be the same. However, some 
bit flipping will inevitably occur. If m responses generated by 
the same n cells at different times are considered, an estimate 
of the reliability of the identification is given by the maximum 
fractional Hamming distance, maxIntraHD, between all the 














In the ideal situation of 100% reliability, all the responses 
should be the same, and maxIntraHD will therefore be zero. 
For secret key generation, the Code Offset-based Helper 
Data Algorithms, as described in [13], consist of two steps. In 
the initialization step, a response, R, is provided by the SRAM 
and a codeword, c, is randomly chosen from an Error 
Correcting Code (ECC). The XOR of R and c forms the code 
offset that is stored as helper data, = ⨁ . In the key 
generation step, a new response, R’, is provided by the SRAM. 
The XOR of R’ and the data stored, = ⨁ = ′⊕ ⊕
, enters the decoder of the error correcting code to recover c 
and then the initial response R, which is used as a seed for a 
cryptographic key generation algorithm. 
The worst-case probability that a bit in the SRAM responses 
may change (the bit error or bit flipping probability p) can be 
estimated by the maxIntraHD defined in Equation (1). With a 
probability of 1−p, the bit in the responses does not change. 
Assuming that all bits in the responses are independent, the 
probability of exactly t errors occurring in n bits is given by a 
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Hence, the probability that a string of n bits contains more 
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The authors in [13] and [26] proposed the use of the model 
described above to select the most suitable ECC according to 
bit error probability, p. Given p (estimated by maxIntraHD) and 
given an ECC (with n-bit codewords and capacity to correct 
up to t errors), the capability of the ECC to achieve a given 
Ptotal can be evaluated with Equation (3). The number of errors 
to be corrected and, hence, the complexity of the ECC, 
increases as the value of maxIntraHD gets higher. 
 
2) Minimum entropy 
Minimum entropy summarizes the adequacy of n memory 
cells to generate random numbers. According to NIST 
recommendations [27], minimum entropy measures the worst 
case of uncertainty in a random variable. If the random 
variable is the start-up value observed at the i-th memory cell 
and pimax is the maximum probability of taking logic value ’0’ 
or ’1’, the minimum entropy of the cell as a binary source of 
randomness is: 
 
( ) )(log max2min icell pH −=  (4) 
 
Assuming that the n memory cells have independent start-
up values, the minimum entropy of the n-bit sequence (given 
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For example, if the reliability of the n cells is 100% then the 
minimum entropy is 0%. In contrast, if the reliability is 0% 
and the pimax of the n cells is 0.5 then the minimum entropy is 
100%. The method described above is used in [23] to evaluate 
the minimum entropy of SRAMs. The method described in [5] 
assumes that each byte, instead of each bit, of the SRAM is an 
independent source. Hence, both methods are similar if no 
correlation exists between the bits of a specific byte. In any 
case, correlation between bits should be measured to test 
whether the assumption for Equation (5) is valid. 
 
3) Stable and unstable cells 
One way of evaluating whether n memory cells are 
adequate to generate IDs and secret keys is to measure their 
start-up values after several power-ups under different 
operating conditions. The S cells that always provide the same 
start-up value are adequate to generate IDs while the other U 
cells should not be used for this purpose (n = S+U). Since the 
IDs and secret keys are to be reproduced over varying 
operating conditions, the A cells that are always labeled as S 
for all the conditions are very adequate to generate them while 
the B cells that are always labeled as U always introduce bit 
flipping. There are also C cells, which are stable under certain 
conditions and unstable under others, so that n = A + B + C. 
Reliability depends on the percentage of stable cells; that is to 
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say, the cells that never show bit flipping. In contrast, the 
percentage of unstable cells is related to the capability to 









CellsOfUnstablePercentage  (7) 
 
Figure 1 shows the flowchart of the classification process.  
 
4) Independence of sequences 
Given two sequences of n bits, R and R’, provided by n 
memory cells of a SRAM, the way to measure their degree of 
similarity is to evaluate the number of t bits that are different 
in both sequences. This is given by their Hamming distance. 
In the ideal situation of 100% independence, the 
comparison between each pair of bits in the sequences should 
be essentially a Bernoulli trial, which takes value ’1’ (the bits 
are different) with probability p (and a value of ’0’ with 
probability q=1-p). In addition, any given bit in the sequences 
should be equally likely to be ’1’ or ’0’, i.e., the sequences 
should be uniform to be unpredictable as commented below. 
Hence, ideally p=q=0.5 so that nothing is known about the 
cells that are generating the start-up values (which is which 
and what values are being generated). 
If there are no correlations between the bits in different 
sequences, the probability of exactly t different bits appearing 
in n trials (HD = t) is given by a binomial distribution, as 
shown earlier in Equation (2). Given a large set of sequences, 
the distribution of Hamming distances obtained from all the 
possible comparisons between different pairs can be 
approximated by a normal distribution with expected value ⋅  and expected standard deviation ⋅ (1 − ), as stated 
in the de-Moivre-Laplace theorem. 
If there are correlations between bits of different sequences, 
Bernoulli trials remain binomially distributed but with a 
reduction in the number of independent trials or degrees of 
freedom, which becomes N instead of n (N < n) (see [28] for a 
more detailed explanation). Hence, given k sequences of n bits 
generated by SRAM start-up values, their independence is 
evaluated by the average inter fractional HD, and by the 






































































 is the standard deviation of the inter fractional 
HD. 

















 will be (1 − )/ , and N will be n. 
Another way to evaluate whether two n-bit sequences Ri = 
X1i,X2i, … ,Xni, and Rj = X1j,X2j, …,Xnj, where Xkl=±1 (’0’ 
values are converted to ’-1’), are independent or non-














Correlation is zero (i.e., the sequences are independent) if 
the number of ckij that are ’1’ is the same as the number of 
them that are ’-1’, producing a sum of zero. Thus, the 
condition for no correlation is that the sequence of ckij must 
comprise independent Bernoulli random variables which take 
values of ’1’ or ’-1’ with the same probability of 0.5. This is 
equivalent to the condition of uniformity in the sequence of 
ckij. The condition can be evaluated by the NIST Frequency 
(Monobit) Test, as commented below. 
 
5) Uniqueness 
The identifiers generated by genuine and fake memories 
should be sufficiently different to ensure the uniqueness of the 
identification. Uniqueness is achieved if the Hamming 
distance between IDs provided by genuine and fake devices 
(the interdie Hamming distance) is always greater than the 
Hamming distance between IDs provided by the genuine 
device (the intradie Hamming distance). Such condition also 
achieves the uniqueness of the secret key generated because it 
is possible to select the number of errors to be corrected by the 
ECC so that only the genuine device could be able to recover 
the response of the initialization step in the Code Offset-based 
Helper Data Algorithm. 
 
Fig. 1.  Flowchart of memory cell classification. 
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If m identifiers generated by k devices are considered, an 
estimate of the uniqueness of the identification is given by the 
difference between the minimum interdie and the maximum 
intradie fractional Hamming distances, which is known as 

































As reliability increases, the maximum intradie Hamming 
distance decreases (tending to 0%) and, hence, the security 
distance increases. Similarly, as ID independence increases, 
the minimum interdie Hamming distance increases (tending to 
50%), as does the security distance. In the ideal situation of 
100% reliability and independence of identifiers, security 
distance will be 50%. A high security distance means that the 
probability of a genuine SRAM being rejected or a fake 
SRAM being accepted is quite small. In general, the security 
distance decreases as the length of the ID decreases (a detailed 
explanation of this can be found in [18]). 
 
6) Unpredictability 
Several tests can be applied to evaluate the unpredictability 
or randomness of a sequence. In this paper, tests taken from 
the NIST test suite for randomness [29] were applied, as 
described below. To be unpredictable, the n-bit sequence 
generated by n memory cells should be uniform (should have 
the same number of ’1’s and ’0’s). In other words, the 
fractional Hamming weight should be 0.5. This condition is 
tested by the NIST Frequency (Monobit) Test. Subsequences 
of an unpredictable sequence should also be unpredictable. 
The cumulative sums of the bits in the subsequences that can 
be formed from the complete sequence (considering ’1’ and ’- 
1’ values) should therefore also be zero, as in the complete 
sequence. This condition is tested by the NIST Cumulative 
Sums Test, in forward mode (if the subsequences are formed 
from the beginning to the end of the complete sequence) or in 
backward mode (if the subsequences are formed from the end 
to the beginning). The number of runs of ’1’s and ’0’s of 
various lengths should also be as expected for a random 
sequence, and the oscillation between zeros and ones should 
not be too fast or too slow. This is evaluated by the NIST Runs 
Test. For these tests, it is recommended that each sequence to 
be tested should have a minimum of 100 bits. 
Each NIST test is statistical: a set of sequences, m, is tested 
and their p-values are obtained. The value of m should be in 
the order of the inverse of the statistical significance level. For 
example, for a significance level of α=0.01 (with a 
confidence, ρ, of 99% when determining unpredictability), 
about 1% of the sequences are expected to fail (p-value<0.01), 
99% of the sequences are expected to pass the test (p-
value≥0.01) and at least 100 sequences should be analyzed. 
NIST prescribes that the proportion of sequences that pass a 






ρ−ρ±ρ  (12) 
 
NIST also examines the distribution of p-values to ensure 
uniformity and calculates a PvalueT (a p-value of the p-
values), which should - if the sequences are unpredictable - 
verify that: 
 
0001.0≥TPvalue  (13) 
B. Evaluation strategy 
Standard low-power dual-port 8-transistor TSMC 90-nm 
SRAM IP modules (TSDGA4096X60M8) were characterized 
experimentally. They were provided as IP modules by 
Europractice, with an operating voltage of 1.2V±10% and an 
operating temperature of -40ºC to 125ºC. The SRAM IP 
module was included in two different digital ASICs (hereafter 
referred to as ASICa and ASICb). The ASICs implement 
different signal processing algorithms, so their layouts are 
different (ASICa and ASICb are described in [30] and [31], 
respectively). In both cases, the SRAM module was used to 
store a set of parameters that the ASICs need for digital signal 
processing. The two ASICs therefore represented a real 
scenario in which to study the capability of an SRAM module 
to generate identifiers and true random numbers when 
powered-up, the SRAM itself forming part of a digital design. 
The main variables considered in the SRAM operating 
conditions were the power supply voltage, Vdd, and 
temperature, T. Another critical factor is aging. The purpose 
of the evaluation strategy was to find a methodology capable 
of simultaneously increasing the reliability and entropy 
offered by a standard SRAM with respect to different 
operating conditions and aging, and which could be carried 
out at low cost and with the SRAM embedded in its operation 
context (because the behavior of the SRAM changes if the 
operation context changes - for example, if the power supply 
ramp-up time changes, as mentioned in the Introduction). 
The first step taken to achieve that objective was to evaluate 
the percentage of stable and unstable cells (Equation (6) and 
Equation (7), respectively) obtained after considering several 
operating conditions, as illustrated in Figure 1. The number of 
measurements (start-ups) taken at each operating condition 
was 20. Ten integrated ASICa circuits were characterized. For 
each circuit, 2,280 bits (start-up values) provided by 40 x 57-
bit words were registered. Those were enough bits to generate 
identifiers, secret keys and random sequences. Twenty 
integrated ASICb circuits were characterized. The SRAM 
module in ASICb (as happens with other ASICs) cannot be 
written/read from the input/output pins as easily as in ASICa. 
Hence, 168 bits (start-up values) provided by 14 x 12-bit 
words were registered for each circuit. Those were enough bits 
to generate identifiers. 
Firstly, classification was performed taking into account 
only nominal operating conditions (Vdd=1.2V and T=25ºC). 
To evaluate the influence of power supply voltage in the 
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classification, the temperature was fixed to the nominal value 
and three operating conditions were considered, (1.08V, 
25ºC), (1.2V, 25ºC), and (1.32V, 25ºC), covering the typical 
variations of ±10% of the nominal Vdd. To evaluate the 
influence of temperature in the classification, the power 
supply voltage was fixed to the nominal value and three 
operating conditions were considered, (1.2V, 5ºC), (1.2V, 
25ºC), and (1.2V, 75ºC), covering variations above and below 
the nominal T. The ASICs were included on a printed circuit 
board (PCB) powered at 5V, but since the ASICa and ASICb 
cores (including the SRAM) needed 1.2V, a voltage regulator 
was used to generate the required voltage for the ASIC core. 
The regulator’s output voltage was set by the ratio of two 
external resistors, one of which was a digital potentiometer. A 
digital switch made it possible to power down the ASIC 
(including the SRAM). A precision temperature forcing 
system, a Thermonics T-2650BV, was employed to control the 
operating temperature of the ASIC samples. 
The second step was to evaluate the reliability (measured as 
maxIntraHD in Equation (1)) and entropy (measured as Hmin in 
Equation (5)) obtained without classifying the cells, that is, 
using stable and unstable cells to generate the responses. 
Firstly, responses generated at nominal operating conditions 
were analyzed. Secondly, responses generated at several 
operating conditions were also considered. 
The third step was to evaluate how the classification and, 
subsequently, the adequate use of cells simultaneously 
improves the reliability and entropy under operating 
conditions not considered in the classification process. A 
detailed analysis was done with ASICa circuits to evaluate the 
improvements under nine operating conditions: (1) (1.08V, 
25ºC), (2) (1.2V, 25ºC), (3) (1.32V, 25ºC), (4) (1.2V, 5ºC), (5) 
(1.2V, 75ºC), (6) (1.08V, 5ºC), (7) (1.32V, 5ºC), (8) (1.08V, 
75ºC), and (9) (1.32V, 75ºC). The improvements in reliability 
were confirmed with more ASICb circuits under less operating 
conditions (the five conditions from (1) to (5), described 
above). The classification technique selected was that which 
offered the best trade-off between performance and cost. 
The fourth step was to assess the advantages of using the 
selected technique to generate identifiers, secret keys, and true 
random numbers, testing particularly the independence and 
unpredictability of the generated sequences under nominal 
operating conditions. 
Finally, the fifth step was to evaluate how the selected 
classification technique responds to aging. Three integrated 
ASICa circuits were characterized. For each circuit, 91,200 
bits (start-up values) provided by 4 x 400 x 57-bit words were 
registered. One of the ASICa circuits was used to test how the 
stable and unstable cells change in time under nominal 
operating conditions and normal SRAM activity. The other 
circuits were used to test the evolution under operating 
conditions that accelerate aging and/or NBTI (Negative Bias 
Temperature Instability), one of them working continuously at 
increased power supply voltage (1.32V, 25ºC) and the other at 
increased temperature (1.2V, 75ºC). A climatic chamber ACS-
EOS 200TC was used to carry out the last experiments. 
The inputs to configure the ASICs were provided by an 
Agilent 16720A Pattern Generator while the outputs 
(including the start-up values of the SRAM) were recorded by 
an Agilent 16823 Logic Analyzer. To avoid problems of data 
remanence, the tested ASICs were kept shut down for a fair 
amount of time (30 seconds) between start-ups, as suggested 
in [32]. A Matlab program running on a computer was used to 
automatize the characterization measurements with the 
Instrument Control Toolbox. The Matlab software reported in 
[33] was adapted for this purpose. 
III. WAYS TO IMPROVE RELIABILITY AND ENTROPY 
A. Influence of stable and unstable cells 
The percentages of stable and unstable cells, as computed in 
Equation (6) and Equation (7), respectively, were measured in 
10 samples from ASICa (2,280 bits per sample) and 20 
samples from ASICb (168 bits per sample), considering 20 
measurements per operation condition analyzed, following the 
flowchart in Figure 1. 
The mean values of the percentage of stable cells, together 
with their standard errors, are shown in the first and third rows 
of Table I. The values in the first column considered only 
nominal operating conditions (1.2V, 25ºC). The values in the 
second column considered three operating conditions with 
three different Vdd values at nominal temperature, (1.08V, 
25ºC), (1.2V, 25ºC), and (1.32V, 25ºC). The values in the 
third column considered three operating conditions with three 
different T values at nominal Vdd (1.2V, 5ºC), (1.2V, 25ºC), 
and (1.2V, 75ºC). Finally, the values in the fourth column 
considered all the operating conditions analyzed (nine for 
ASICa and five for ASICb). From the results, it can be 
concluded that the cells that are always stable (A cells) 
decrease if Vdd variations are considered and decrease even 
more if T variations are considered. 
The maximum intra HD, as described in Equation (1), was 
calculated for the ASICa and ASICb samples: (a) under 
TABLE I 









Percentage of stable cells (ASICa) 91.86%±0.17% 89.70%±0.19% 82.58%±0.26% 78.56%±0.43% 
Maximum intra HD (ASICa) 6.42%±0.12% 7.25%±0.13% 17.67%±0.23% 18.83%±0.25% 
Percentage of stable cells (ASICb) 86.58%±0.62% 80.98%±0.84% 73.72%±0.65% 70.30%±0.77% 
Maximum intra HD (ASICb) 8.36%±0.59% 12.97%±0.78% 20.43%±0.66% 22.70%±0.76% 
Percentage of unstable cells (ASICa) 8.14%±0.17% 6.11%±0.10% 0.75%±0.04% 0.34%±0.04% 
Minimum entropy (ASICa) 3.04%±0.09% 3.01%±0.08% 1.98%±0.08% 1.93%±0.07% 
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nominal conditions, (b) with three different Vdd values at 
nominal temperature, (c) with three different T values at 
nominal Vdd, and (d) considering all the conditions analyzed. 
The mean values for ASICa (obtained after evaluating 10 
samples from ASICa, with 13 sets of 128 bits per sample) are 
shown together with their standard errors in the second row of 
Table I. The pairwise comparisons calculated per sample and 
per set of 128 memory cells were: (a) 3,160 pairs among 80 
responses under nominal conditions (the number of responses 
is m in Equation (1)), (b) and (c) 28,680 pairs among 240 
responses, and (d) 258,840 pairs among 720 responses under 
all conditions. Similarly, the maximum intra HD was 
calculated for 20 samples from ASICb and 1 set of 128 bits 
per sample. The mean values with their standard errors are 
shown in the fourth row of Table I. The pairwise comparisons 
calculated per sample and set of 128 memory cells were: (a) 
190 pairs among 20 responses at nominal conditions (m=20 in 
Equation (1)), (b) and (c) 1,770 pairs among 60 responses, and 
(d) 4,950 pairs among 100 responses at all conditions. In both 
ASICs, it can be seen how the maximum intra HD increases as 
the percentage of stable cells decreases. 
The mean values of the percentage of unstable cells, with 
their standard errors, are shown in the fifth row of Table I. As 
occurred with the stable cells, the cells that are always 
unstable (B cells) were found to decrease with Vdd variations 
and decrease even more with T variations. 
Minimum entropy, as described in Equation (5), was 
calculated for the 2,280 memory cells analyzed in the 10 
samples from ASICa. Figure 2 illustrates how the minimum 
entropy of one of the samples under nominal operating 
conditions changes versus the number of measurements 
considered to evaluate the pimax. With 100 start-up 
measurements, Hmin converges to its asymptotic value. 100 
start-ups were therefore considered to evaluate the maximum 
probability observed for each memory cell (pimax). The Hmin 
was calculated: (a) under nominal conditions, (b) with three 
different Vdd values at nominal temperature, (c) with three 
different T values at nominal Vdd, and (d) considering all nine 
conditions. The minimum value was recorded when several 
operating conditions were considered. The mean values with 
their standard errors are shown in the sixth row of Table I. It 
can be seen how the Hmin is low because the percentage of 
unstable cells is low and that it decreases as the percentage of 
unstable cells decreases. 
The next analysis was aimed at evaluating how the 
classification of cells into stable and unstable cells can 
simultaneously improve both the reliability and randomness of 
the SRAM. The analysis was carried out with ASICa samples 
and confirmed with ASICb samples. To classify the cells, 
several operating conditions can be analyzed: the more 
conditions are analyzed, the more accurate the classification. 
However, it is impractical to take into account too many 
conditions and, in the case of unstable cells, as shown in the 
fifth column of Table I, the number of unstable cells may be 
too small. Two forms of classifying the cells as stable and 
unstable were therefore analyzed: (a) taking into account the 
Vdd values and considering the three operating conditions 
(1.08V, 25ºC), (1.2V, 25ºC), and (1.32V, 25ºC), and (b) taking 
into account the T values and considering the three operating 
conditions (1.2V, 5ºC), (1.2V, 25ºC), and (1.2V, 75ºC). In 
both cases, classification was carried out by considering 20 
measurements per operation condition. 
B. Reliability improvement with classification 
To evaluate the reliability improvement, the start-up values 
provided by the SRAM cells were organized as 13 sets of 128 
bits per each ASICa sample and evaluated per each operation 
condition (a maximum of 13 sets per sample can be generated 
by the A cells found with T variations in all the samples). The 
maximum intra HD between 80 responses generated by the 
same 128 cells at different times was calculated for three 
situations: (a) with no classification, so that the 128 cells were 
any of the memory cells in the SRAM; (b) with classification 
taking into account Vdd and (c) with classification taking into 
account T values, so that the responses were generated by 128 
memory cells classified as A cells. 
Table II  shows the mean values (obtained after averaging 
over the 10 samples from ASICa and the 13 sets per sample) 
and the standard errors of the maximum intra HD under each 
operation condition. It can be seen how using stable cells 
always improves reliability. Classification taking into account 
Vdd values provides the best reliabilities under operating 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Convergence of the minimum entropy to its asymptotic value. 
 
TABLE II 
MEAN AND STANDARD ERRORS FOR MAXINTRAHD IN ASICA SAMPLES UNDER 






based on Vdd 
With 
classification 
based on T 
(1.08, 25) 6.41%±0.13% 0.99%±0.06% 1.17%±0.07% 
(1.2, 25) 6.42%±0.12% 0.87%±0.06% 1.12%±0.07% 
(1.32, 25) 6.56%±0.12% 1.02%±0.06% 1.13%±0.07% 
(1.08, 5) 7.45%±0.13% 4.45%±0.14% 1.94%±0.08% 
(1.2, 5) 7.85%±0.20% 4.47%±0.13% 1.97%±0.15% 
(1.32, 5) 7.62%±0.13% 4.78%±0.14% 2.19%±0.08% 
(1.08, 75) 4.81%±0.14% 2.03%±0.11% 1.02%±0.09% 
(1.2, 75) 4.65%±0.12% 1.94%±0.10% 0.76%±0.06% 
(1.32, 75) 4.75%±0.12% 2.10%±0.10% 1.03%±0.08% 
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conditions with nominal temperature and also improves 
reliability under the other operating conditions. Classification 
taking into account T values provides the best reliabilities 
under operating conditions with non-nominal temperature and 
also improves reliability under the other operating conditions. 
To test the statistical significance of these results, a two-
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was performed to compare 
(a) the distributions of the maximum intra HD obtained 
without classification and with Vdd classification, and (b) the 
distributions of the maximum intra HD obtained without 
classification and with T classification. This nonparametric 
test was applied because the underlying distribution of the 
maximum intra HD is unknown. The null hypothesis was that 
the maximum intra HDs calculated with and without 
classification come from the same continuous distribution 
(i.e., classification is not relevant). The alternative hypothesis 
was that they come from different distributions (i.e., the 
influence of classification is relevant). If the p-value resulting 
from the test is low, it means that the two distributions are 
different, but if the p-value is close to 1, it means that the two 
distributions are similar. The p-value is very accurate for large 
sample sizes, and reasonably accurate for sample sizes n1 and 
n2, such that ( ⋅ )/( + ) ≥ 4. In these tests, n1 = n2= 
130, so the p-values obtained were reasonably accurate. In 
both cases, the test rejected the null hypothesis at the 5% 
significance level. The p-value obtained in test (a) was 5.7e-51 
(and the maximum difference between the empirical 
cumulative distribution functions was 0.93). The p-value 
obtained in test (b) was 4.1e-56 (and the maximum difference 
between the empirical cumulative distribution functions was 
0.98). The conclusion is that classification of the cells 
modifies the distribution of the maximum intra HD. The 
advantage is that the maximum intra HD becomes smaller, as 
is desirable for ID and secret key generation. 
The real scenario is that IDs or secret keys can be registered 
under one set of operating conditions and should then be 
verified under different operating conditions (not under the 
same conditions, as calculated in the results of Table II). If the 
maximum intra HD between responses provided by the same 
memory cells under all the possible operating conditions is 
calculated, the mean values and standard errors obtained for 
all the samples from ASICa and the 13 sets considered per 
sample are shown in the first row of Table III. In the second 
row of Table III similar behavior can be observed in the 20 
samples from ASICb with one set per sample (with 122 bits 
because a maximum of 122 A cells was found with T 
variations in all the samples).  
C. Entropy improvement with classification 
Minimum entropy was calculated using Equation (5) for 
three situations: (a) with no classification of the cells, 
therefore considering the 2,280 bits analyzed, (b) considering 
only the cells classified as unstable under the three operating 
conditions with nominal T and varying Vdd, and (c) 
considering only the cells classified as unstable under the three 
operating conditions with nominal Vdd and varying T. Table 
IV shows the mean values (the average of 10 samples from 
ASICa) and the standard errors of the minimum entropy under 
each operation condition. It can be seen how classification 
taking into account Vdd variations provides the highest 
minimum entropy under operating conditions with nominal T, 
and also considerably improves entropy under other operating 
conditions. Classification taking into account T variations 
provides the highest minimum entropy under operating 
conditions with non-nominal T. The problem is that the 
number of unstable cells found with T variations was very 
small (0.75% on average, as shown in Table I), which is 
impractical for many applications (it represents an average of 
17 cells in 2,280). On the other hand, the number of cells 
classified as unstable with Vdd variations was 6.11% on 
average (an average of 139 cells in 2,280). 
A two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was performed to 
test the statistical significance of the minimum entropy results. 
The distribution of the minimum entropy obtained with 10 
samples from ASICa under the nine operating conditions (90 
values) without classification was compared with (a) the 
distribution with Vdd-based classification and (b) the 
distribution with T-based classification. With such sample 
sizes (90 data), the p-values obtained were reasonably 
accurate. Again, this nonparametric test was applied because 
the underlying distribution of the minimum entropy is 
unknown. The null hypothesis was that the minimum entropies 
calculated with and without classification come from the same 
continuous distribution (i.e., classification is not relevant). The 
alternative hypothesis was that they come from different 
distributions (i.e., the influence of classification is relevant). In 
both cases, the test rejected the null hypothesis at the 5% 
significance level. The p-value obtained for both tests was 
4.1e-41 (and the maximum difference between the empirical 
TABLE III 
MEAN AND STANDARD ERRORS FOR MAXINTRAHD IN ASICA AND ASICB 






based on Vdd 
With 
classification 
based on T 
ASICa 18.83%±0.25% 6.80%±0.25% 5.76%±0.26% 
ASICb 23.30%±0.80% 10.89%±0.57% 4.87%±0.56% 
 
TABLE IV 
MEAN AND STANDARD ERRORS FOR HMIN IN ASICA SAMPLES UNDER 







based on Vdd 
With 
classification 
based on T 
(1.08, 25) 3.16%±0.06% 42.21%±0.77% 39.06%±1.48% 
(1.2, 25) 3.04%±0.09% 42.52%±1.06% 40.67%±2.06% 
(1.32, 25) 3.08%±0.07% 42.33%±0.91% 41.60%±1.41% 
(1.08, 5) 3.65%±0.07% 10.39%±0.82% 29.32%±3.33% 
(1.2, 5) 3.64%±0.08% 10.54%±0.58% 31.24%±3.14% 
(1.32, 5) 3.73%±0.07% 10.58%±0.79% 30.07%±3.56% 
(1.08, 75) 2.13%±0.11% 14.56%±0.96% 29.98%±3.16% 
(1.2, 75) 1.98%±0.08% 13.80%±0.60% 30.57%±2.33% 
(1.32, 75) 2.04%±0.06% 14.02%±0.56% 28.89%±3.06% 
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cumulative distribution functions was 1). The conclusion is 
that classification of the cells modifies the distribution of the 
minimum entropy. The advantage is that the minimum entropy 
becomes bigger, as is desirable for random number generation. 
IV. CLASSIFICATION BASED ON VDD VARIATIONS 
Classification taking into account Vdd variations provides a 
good trade-off between improvements in reliability and 
entropy and simplicity of realization. Furthermore, the number 
of unstable cells detected is not as small as when taking into 
account T variations. This was therefore the classification 
method selected to be implemented and studied in greater 
detail. The way the method was applied and the advantages 
obtained in the ASICa and ASICb samples are summarized 
below. 
No spatial correlation was detected in the stable and 
unstable cells found by the classification. Figure 3 shows the 
40 x 57 memory cells analyzed in one of the ASICa samples. 
The stable cells (A cells) can be seen in white in Figure 3a and 
the unstable cells (B cells) can be seen in white in Figure 3b In 
all the samples, there are no rows or columns in the SRAM 
with the same A cells detected. In the case of B cells, since 
their number is much smaller, there are no rows in all the 
SRAMs with the same B cells, but some of the columns are 
equal (particularly, those with one or no B cells). These 
columns are different in the different ASICa samples. 
A. Advantages for the generation of identifiers 
1) Independence of the IDs 
The start-up values provided by the A cells of the same 
SRAM should be independent to ensure that an ID cannot be 
ascertained through knowledge of other IDs provided by the 
same SRAM. At least 1,800 A cells were detected in four 
samples from ASICa with the proposed classification. They 
were organized as 18 x 100-bit IDs. To evaluate the 
independence of the IDs, the fractional HDs between all the 
pairwise combinations of the 18 IDs (generated under nominal 
conditions) were calculated, giving a total of 153 HDs. Rather 
than only one set, 100 sets of 18 x 100-bit IDs were analyzed 
in order to consider all the possible displacements between the 
IDs generated: i.e., the first set considers that the first A cell of 
the first ID is the first A cell found in the SRAM; the second 
set considers that the first A cell of the first ID is the second A 
cell found in the SRAM (thus, the 18 IDs generated are 
displaced by 1 bit in relation to the first set); and so on, till the 
100th set, which considers that the first A cell of the first ID is 
the 99th A cell found in the SRAM. A total of 15,300 HDs 
were therefore calculated per ASIC sample. The objective was 
to discover any possible correlation in the IDs generated. 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of 61,200 fractional HDs 
obtained from four ASICa samples, and how the histogram 
can be approximated by a normal distribution, in this case with 
















=0.052. Applying Equation (9), the number of 
independent bits in the sequences is 92.59%, which means a 
very high level of independence among the IDs provided by 
the same SRAM, as summarized in Section II.A.4. 
To further analyze correlation, the scalar product between 
the 153 pairs of IDs per sample was calculated as in Equation 
(10). The uniformity of the 153 sequences of 100 ckij 
correlation bits was analyzed using the NIST Frequency Test. 
The proportions of sequences with a p-value bigger than 0.01 
(a confidence of 99%) verify the condition in Equation (12) 
and the distributions of p-values verify Equation (13). It can 
therefore be concluded, with a confidence of 99%, that the IDs 
provided by the same SRAM are not correlated. 
IDs generated by different SRAMs should also be fairly 
independent to ensure their uniqueness. That is to say, an ID 
should be generated by only one single ASIC sample. To test 
this feature, the interdie fractional Hamming distances of 128- 
bit IDs obtained from the 20 ASICb samples after applying 
classification were calculated (95,000 HDs were calculated 
considering all operating conditions). Again, the histogram 
can be approximated by a normal distribution, in this case with 








=0.483 (which is very close to 0.5, as 








=0.0447. Applying Equation (9), the number of 
     
 (a) (b) 
Fig. 3.  (a) Stable cells depicted in white and (b) unstable cells depicted in 
white after classification based on 20 measurements per Vdd value. 
  
Fig. 4.  Distribution of fractional HDs between IDs from the same SRAM. 
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independent bits in the sequences is 97.64%. Hence, the 
comparison between each pair of bits in the IDs generated by 
different SRAMs (as also happens with the IDs generated by 
the same SRAM) can be approximated by a Bernoulli trial as 
explained in Section II.A.4. 
 
2) Unpredictability of the IDs 
To evaluate the unpredictability of the IDs generated by the 
A cells both from the same and from different SRAMs, the 
NIST Frequency Test, Cumulative Sums Test (forward and 
backward) and Runs Test were applied to the 18 x 100-bit IDs 
obtained from the ASICa samples. The IDs from four samples 
were analyzed (a total of 72 x 100-bit sequences). A 
confidence of 95% was selected for the tests on this set of 
sequences. The results for the uniformity of p-values and the 
proportion of passing sequences are shown in Table V. 
Columns C1 to C10 correspond to the frequencies of p-values 
in the ten discrete bins into which the interval of values can be 
divided. Column PvalueT is the p-value of the p-values and the 
last column shows the proportion of sequences with a p-value 
bigger than 0.05. All the tests were passed (Equations (12) and 
(13) were fulfilled), so the IDs can be said to be unpredictable 
with a confidence of 95%. In particular, the Frequency Test 
ensured that the numbers of 0’s and 1’s in the IDs were 
distributed uniformly.  
 
3) Uniqueness of the IDs 
Classification based on Vdd variations allows generating 
IDs with much smaller lengths, but the same separation 
between genuine and fake populations, because the maximum 
intradie Hamming distance is much smaller and the minimum 
interdie Hamming distance does not vary (or even increases 
slightly). For example, the security distances (calculated as in 
Equation (11)) obtained with 20 samples from ASICb are 
shown in Table VI for different ID lengths. It can be seen how 
70-bit IDs provide the same security distance than 128-bit IDs 
without classification. This represents a reduction of 45% in 
the ID length with the same security. 
As the length of the identifiers shortens thanks to 
classification, the number of different IDs that can be 
generated by a SRAM (known as the number of challenge-
response pairs in a SRAM PUF) increases. For example, in the 
SRAM analyzed in both ASICs, more than 80% on average of 
the memory cells are stable with Vdd variations (cells labeled 
as A) and the responses can be reduced in length by around 
45%. The new number of challenge-response pairs, CRPnew, 
with a similar security distance to the original number, 











8.0  (14) 
 
Hence, the number of different IDs that can be generated 
from the SRAM analyzed increases by a factor of 1.45 thanks 
to classification. 
 
B. Advantages for the generation of secret keys 
Several ECCs have been reported in literature for extracting 
secret keys from PUFs. The codes should correct random 
rather than burst errors. Hence, neither Reed-Solomon nor 
convolutional codes, which have very good burst error 
correcting capabilities, are adequate for PUFs. LDPC codes 
are very efficient but require very large, sparse binary 
matrices, making them inadequate for hardware 
implementations or platforms with low computational 
resources. BCH codes have a very good error correcting 
capability, but their decoders are very complex to be efficient 
in hardware. As analyzed in [26], the simplest codes for 
implementation (particularly in hardware) are repetition codes 
and Reed-Muller codes of the first order. We therefore 
focused on these two types of ECCs to correct the errors 
produced in the SRAM start-up values. 
An [n,k,d]-code means a binary code C with codeword 
length n, message length k, and minimum distance d. 
Repetition codes have d=n and can correct up to =  
errors. Reed-Muller codes of the first order, usually denoted as 
R(1,m), are linear codes with parameters = 2 , k = m+1, 
and = 2 . They have the capability to correct up to =  errors. 
As summarized in Section II.A.1, if the worst case bit error 
probability, p, is known (or estimated by the maximum intra 
HD) and the ECC is able to correct up to t errors, then the 
probability of a sequence having more than t errors is given by 
Ptotal in Equation (3). The authors in [13] and [26] consider 
that a Ptotal of 10
-6 is a conservative value that fulfills the 
requirements of most of typical security applications. 
The performance of Reed-Muller and repetition codes is 
illustrated in the ASICa samples. As was shown in Table III, 
TABLE V 
RESULTS REPORTED BY NIST TESTS APPLIED TO 72 IDS OF 100 BITS FROM ASICA SAMPLES 
Test C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 PvalueT Proportion 
Frequency 8 7 6 7 10 11 10 0 8 5 0.1695 0.92 
Cumulative sums (fw) 11 6 10 8 3 7 3 2 17 5 0.0015 0.94 
Cumulative sums (bw) 7 7 7 9 6 5 5 6 16 4 0.0949 0.96 




SECURITY DISTANCES FOR DIFFERENT ID LENGTHS IN ASICB SAMPLES 
 Without With classification based on Vdd 
ID bits 128 60 65 70 80 105 
Security Dist.  
(in %) 
17.40 16.05 16.37 17.67 19.47 23.03 
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the worst case bit error probability if classification is not 
applied is 18.83% on average. Using this probability, the left 
part of Table VII illustrates the Ptotal achieved by the Reed- 
Muller and repetition ECCs. Even a Reed-Muller code R(1,9) 
is not able to fulfill a Ptotal in the order of 10
-6. A repetition 
code would need a codeword length of 39 bits to reach that 
order of Ptotal. As summarized in Section II.A.1, the responses 
generated by the SRAM should be of the same length as the 
codewords, n, (or a multiple of n) to calculate the helper data 
in the Code Offset-based Helper Data Algorithms. If a secret 
of s error-free bits is required, ⋅  bits should be provided 
by the SRAM (these bits will be named as source bits for the 
[n,k,d]-code). The left part of Table VII illustrates the source 
bits (without applying classification) required by each ECC to 
obtain a secret of 128 error-free bits. In both cases, the number 
of source bits is very high. 
With classification based on Vdd variations, the worst case 
bit error probability is reduced to 6.80% on average for 
ASICa. In this case, the right part of Table VII shows that a 
Reed- Muller code R(1,6) and a repetition code 
Repetition[13,1,13] would be able to fulfill a Ptotal in the order 
of 10-6. The number of source bits to be processed is reduced 
by 82% in the case of Reed-Muller codes and by 67% in the 
case of repetition codes. Classification reduces not only the 
number of bits to be processed but also the complexity of the 
two ECCs (the Reed-Muller and the repetition ECCs). For 
example, if the low-resource first-order Reed-Muller decoder 
reported in [26] is employed, which requires (2 + 6 − 1) 
Flip Flops, ( + − 2) XOR gates, 9m AND gates, ( + − 1) OR gates, and m NOT gates, sequential 
elements are reduced by 82% and combinatorial elements by 
47% since m is reduced from 9 to 6. In the case of repetition 
decoders, which can be implemented by a counter and a 
comparator, a 4-bit counter instead of a 6-bit counter is 
enough. 
The unpredictability of the responses provided by the 
SRAM cells (described in the subsection above) ensures that 
no information is leaked by the helper data stored for secret 
key generation, as is desirable.  
C. Advantages for the generation of random numbers 
The bit strings generated from the start-up values of a given 
set of SRAM cells are not very random. If around 80% of the 
memory cells are stable, that means that 80% of the bits in the 
strings are always the same: i.e., the probability of those cells 
producing a “0” or “1” is approximately 1. As a matter of fact, 
in the SRAM analyzed, the minimum entropy value when no 
classification was applied ranged from 2.67% to 3.46% under 
nominal operating conditions. The unpredictability of start-up 
values under nominal conditions was analyzed for the ASICa 
samples by applying the Frequency, Cumulative Sums and 
Runs Tests from the NIST Test Suite, as explained in Section 
II.A.5. 100 start-up sequences provided by 100 memory cells 
were analyzed and a confidence of 99% was selected. If no 
classification was applied, the sequences failed all the tests. 
With classification based on Vdd variations, minimum 
entropy increased to between 37.28% and 47.15% under 
nominal operating conditions. Considering again 100 start-up 
measurements of 100 bits, but now generated by 100 memory 
cells classified as B in the registration phase, all the above 
mentioned NIST tests were passed (Equations (12) and (13) 
were fulfilled). Table VIII shows the results for the uniformity 
of the p-values and the proportion of passing sequences 
provided in the final analysis report after completing the tests 
on one of the ASICa samples. The last column shows the 
proportion of sequences with a p-value bigger than 0.01. It can 
therefore be concluded with a confidence of 99% that the 
sequences are random.  
If better performance is required of sequences generated 
from the SRAM start-up values, post processing functions 
must be implemented to eliminate bias and increase entropy 
(i.e., the entropy distillation process). The most widespread 
methods used for this purpose are the XOR combination [34], 
Von Neumann’s corrector, and hash functions [5], [23]. The 
advantages of using the proposed method will be illustrated 
using the latter approach, which, for SRAMs, was adopted in 
[5], [23]. The minimum entropy value defines the amount of 
source bits that must be processed by the hash functions in 
order to obtain a full entropy bit string. In the SRAM 
analyzed, the minimum entropy value under the worst 
TABLE VII 
RESULTS OBTAINED WITH DIFFERENT ERROR CORRECTING CODES 
Without classification With classifications based on Vdd 
ECC PTOTAL Source bits ECC PTOTAL Source bits 
R(1,9)=RM[512,10,256] 3.38e-4 6,656 R(1,6)=RM[64,7,32] 4.36e-6 1,216 
Repetition[39,1,39] 5.17e-6 4,992 Repetition[13,1,13] 7.99e-6 1,664 
 
TABLE VIII 
RESULTS REPORTED BY NIST TESTS APPLIED TO 100 START-UP SEQUENCES OF 100 MEMORY CELLS 
Test C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 PvalueT Proportion 
Frequency 9 6 8 14 8 19 14 0 11 11 0.0043 0.96 
Cumulative sums (fw) 11 2 8 13 8 9 8 9 16 16 0.0669 0.98 
Cumulative sums (bw) 10 4 7 10 6 9 8 15 20 11 0.0235 0.98 
Runs 8 11 10 9 11 10 15 7 9 10 0.8978 0.99 
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operating conditions when the method was not applied was 
1.98% on average (as shown in Table IV). 808 bytes are 
therefore necessary to obtain a fully random seed of 128 bits, 
1616 bytes to obtain one of 256 bits, and so on. If the 
classification is done based on Vdd variations, the minimum 
entropy value under the worst operating conditions increases 
to 10.39% on average (as shown in Table IV). This means that 
154 bytes are required for a fully random seed of 128 bits, 308 
bytes for one of 256 bits, and so on. This represents a 
reduction of 81% in the input data that hashes must process. 
For example, if the lightweight SHA-256 structure described 
in [23] is used, the time required to obtain a fully random 
sequence is calculated as (source_bits · hash_cycles) / 
(hash_input_bits · frequency). Since the input block size of the 
structure (hash_input_bits) is 512 bits and the hash is executed 
in 64 clock cycles (hash_cycles), the time required for 
generating the random numbers at a clock frequency of 
200MHz (frequency) is reduced, as is summarized in Table 
IX. The reduction in processing time is even more noticeable 
if lightweight hash realizations with lower throughput are 
employed.  
D. Advantages for implementation 
For use in a real scenario, the classification method based 
on Vdd variations involves two phases. In the first phase 
(hereafter referred to as the registration phase), the cells of the 
SRAM analyzed are labeled as A and B. In the second phase 
(hereafter referred to as the generation phase), the start-up 
values of the cells analyzed in the registration phase are read 
at nominal Vdd, so as to generate one bit string with the start-
up values of A cells (for IDs and secret keys) and another with 
the start-up values of B cells (for random numbers). According 
to the experimental results discussed above, a good 
registration phase is usually ensured if the range in which the 
memory can operate normally is analyzed, which is usually 
±10% of the nominal value, Vddnom (for example, the three 
values 0.9·Vddnom, Vddnom, and 1.1·Vddnom, are all adequate). 
The method can therefore be applied without unplugging the 
memory from its operation context. Also, the operating 
temperature does not need to be controlled, eliminating the 
need for big, costly temperature forcing systems. 
The first phase should be carried out at least once to classify 
the cells. Once the cells are classified, the identifiers and 
random numbers are generated by executing the second phase, 
with no need to repeat the first phase. The first phase can be 
repeated, if necessary, during the lifetime of the SRAM to 
refine the classification, considering other possible field 
operating conditions (in particular, other ambient 
temperatures). In this case, the cells labeled as A (or B) are the 
cells again labeled as A (or B). The rest of the cells are labeled 
as C. Care should be taken because, as has been shown in the 
previous section, the number of B cells may be very low if 
several operating conditions are considered (the number of A 
cells is usually high). With this in mind, the number of cells 
could be counted at the registration phase to ensure a 
minimum number of the required cells at all times. It is 
important to have a minimum number of A cells to generate 
IDs and/or secret keys and a minimum number of B cells to 
generate random numbers. When the first phase is carried out 
without indicating that it has been repeated, all the previously 
stored labels are deleted and the newly obtained labels are 
stored. In the latter case, the registration phase can adapt the 
classification to take into account SRAM aging, as commented 
below. 
The registration phase should always be carried out using an 
appropriately authorized verification system (known as a 
Trusted Third Party or TTP). If the registration phase is 
repeated, the previous IDs or keys are revoked and the new 
ones are registered by the Trusted Third Party. Taking into 
account the large number of attacks that may compromise an 
ID or, especially, a key, the capability to allow the easy 
creation of new registrations is another advantage of the 
proposed method. 
The number of measurements, Q, taken at the same power 
supply, Vdd, to carry out the registration phase should not be 
too small or too large. As an example, Figure 5a illustrates the 
number of stable cells found versus the Q measurements taken 
at each of the three Vdd values for one of the ASICa samples. 
A small number of measurements does not detect stable cells 
well. As the number of measurements increases, the number of 
cells classified as A decreases, although there is a number 
above which the rate of decrease becomes very small. On the 
other hand, a large number of measurements fails to detect 
adequate unstable cells. As the number of measurements 
TABLE IX 
ADVANTAGES TO OBTAIN 256-BIT STRINGS WITH FULL ENTROPY 
Source bits needed Time using the SHA-256 in [23] 
Without With classification Without With classification 
1,616 bytes 308 bytes 8.08 μs 1.54 μs 
 
     
                     
 (a) (b) (c) 
Fig. 5.  Number of (a) stable and (b) unstable cells, and (c) minimum entropy at nominal conditions versus the number of measurements. 
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increases, the number of cells classified as B increases. This is 
illustrated in Figure 5b for the same ASICa sample, with the Q 
measurements taken at each of the three Vdd values. As the 
number of measurements increases, the probability of bit 
flipping decreases (a cell is classified as unstable if its start-up 
value changes only once), which means that the minimum 
entropy provided by the cells classified as B decreases. This is 
illustrated in Figure 5c, which shows the minimum entropy 
provided by the unstable cells selected at each number Q of 
measurements for the same ASICa sample, calculated under 
nominal conditions. In the SRAMs analyzed, Q=20 
measurements were selected as a good trade-off for 
classification (this is why the results shown in the previous 
sections considered 20 start-ups per operating condition when 
carrying out classification). 
The blocks needed to implement the classification method 
are the following. (a) A voltage block to power down the 
memory or power it up to the adequate power supply voltage. 
(b) A classification block to analyze which cells of the 
memory should be labeled as A and which as B, if the 
operation mode is the registration phase. If the operation mode 
is the generation phase, this block sends the classification 
results to the control block. (c) A control block that is in 
charge of all the other blocks and indicates when the method 
should be initialized, which phase is to be executed, whether 
or not the first phase is to be repeated, the lengths of the 
strings to be generated, the P values of the power supply 
voltages to be analyzed and the Q measurements to be taken 
per Vdd. The control block tells the voltage block when the 
memory should be powered up or down and, in the former 
case, the value of the Vdd. It also enables the reading of the 
memory, by activating the corresponding signals, tells the 
classification block the current operation mode, and, if the 
operation mode is the generation phase, it employs the labels 
stored in the registration phase to generate identifiers and/or 
random numbers. 
The time required for the generation phase depends on the 
time needed to read the memory cells (which is in the range of 
nano or microseconds depending on the memory). The time 
required for the registration phase, timereg, is determined by 
the values P, Q, and the power-down time, timedown, so that ≅ ⋅ ⋅ . The timedown values required to 
avoid data remanence can range from several microseconds to 
several seconds, depending on the memory and its operation 
context [11], [32]. In any case, the registration phase can be 
carried out when the memory is not employed in its 
application context, since the memory is idle for long intervals 
in many applications. For example, many embedded systems 
for sensing applications such as thermostats, keyless entry, 
security systems, etc., employ microcontrollers and SRAMs 
that are active only during short bursts of time (often, only 
milliseconds) and are idle during intervals of many tens of 
seconds. Such microcontrollers are therefore already equipped 
with a voltage block that allows a deep sleep mode to reduce 
power consumption, in which the entire microcontroller, 
including the on-chip SRAM, is powered down [35]. Hence, 
another advantage of the proposed method is that the voltage 
block is already available in many systems and, if it is 
included, it can be exploited also to power down the SRAM 
when it is not being used by the digital signal processing, thus 
saving power. 
The operations carried out by the control and classification 
blocks to implement the proposed classification are very 
simple. A VLSI module was therefore designed which can be 
incorporated into the digital ASIC where the SRAM is 
embedded. The register transfer level (RTL) specification of 
the module was written in the VHDL hardware description 
language. A synthesis tool (Design Analyzer from Synopsys) 
transformed the RTL specification into a set of logic gates, 
considering TSMC 90-nm technology information. The place 
and route tool employed was System-on- Chip (SoC) 
Encounter from Cadence. The active area of the module is 
42,025 μm2. The active area of the 8T TSMC 90-nm SRAM 
IP modules (TSDGA4096X60M8) analyzed is 677,543.051 
μm2. The designed module therefore represents an area 
overhead for the SRAM of 6.20% compared to an SRAM 
without this additional module. In ASICa and ASICb, both of 
which have an active area of 3.46 mm2, the designed module 
occupies 1.21% of the active area. 
E. Advantages for countering aging 
Aging phenomena affect integrated circuit behavior over 
time. In the case of SRAMs the dominant factor is the Bias 
Temperature Instability, BTI, and more specifically (as its 
impact is higher than the PBTI), the Negative Bias 
Temperature Instability, or NBTI. An overview of NBTI and 
other aging effects can be seen in [36]. NBTI may increase the 
theshold voltage (VTH) of the PMOS transistors subjected to 
negative gate to source bias due to high temperature stress 
conditions [37]-[38]. If the preferred start-up value of a cell is 
stored during a long time, the PMOS transistor with smaller 
VTH is turned on and its VTH may increase because of NBTI 
degradation. Hence, that start-up value may become less 
preferred and even the opposite value may become preferred. 
The consequence is that memory cells can be made more 
unstable. On the contrary, if the opposite of the preferred 
startup value is stored during a long time, the cells can be 
made more stable [11], [39]. 
To evaluate aging phenomena, three samples of ASICa 
circuits were considered. First, the classification method based 
on Vdd variations was applied as commented above (three 
Vdd values and 20 measurements per Vdd operating 
condition) to 4 x 10 blocks of 2,280 bits (91,200 bits) per 
sample. The stable (A) and unstable (B) cells were identified 
per each block. After, one of the ASICs was working in 
normal mode (acting as a non-linear controller for automotive 
applications), under nominal operating conditions (1.2V, 
25ºC) during 4 weeks (the circuit was controlling during 8 
hours per work day and powered down the rest of the day, 
except for the time of the registration phase). Their blocks of 
2,280 bits were written with a checkerboard pattern of ‘0’s and 
‘1’s in order to take the measurements of these blocks as the 
reference of zero aging as well as structured stored values. The 
other two ASICs were working continuously during 96 hours 
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under accelerating aging, one of them at increased power 
supply voltage (1.32V, 25ºC) and the other at increased 
temperature (1.2V, 75ºC), so that the influence of power 
supply voltage and temperature were analyzed separately like 
in the other experiments. To evaluate the influence of the 
values stored in the memory cells under accelerated aging, the 
4 sets of 10 blocks were written as follows: (1) the first set 
was written with a checkerboard pattern of ‘0’s and ‘1’s; (2) 
the second with a random sequence of ‘0’s and ‘1’s; (3) in the 
third set, the A cells were written with the opposite of their 
start-up values and the B (and C) cells were written with their 
preferred values (the most repeated value in the 60 
measurements done during classification); and (4) in the 
fourth set, the A cells were written with their start-up values 
and the B (and C) cells were written with the opposite of their 
preferred values. According to the initial classification, the 
values stored in the memory cells of the third set may 
reinforce the stability of A cells and the unstability of B cells. 
This is why that set is referred to as “best” in Tables X and XI. 
On the contrary, the fourth set is referred to as “worst” 
because the values stored may make A cells less stable and B 
cells less unstable. 
The classification method was applied again after normal 
and accelerated aging operation. The initial and final 
percentages of stable and unstable cells were calculated. The 
mean values together with their standard errors are shown in 
Table X (per set of 10 blocks of 2,280 bits). The values before 
and after operation are similar. Only the percentage of B cells 
increase slightly in the “best” sets while decrease slightly in 
the “worst” sets. Hence, if registration of the SRAM is carried 
out at different time points during its lifetime and the long-
term stored values are not carefully selected (as in the “best” 
or “worst” cases), similar percentages of stable and unstable 
cells are expected after classification. 
The next analysis was to evaluate if the cells classified as A 
and B at the two registration phases were the same. Table XI 
shows the relative percentages of cells that were classified as 
A or B at the first registration and change or not at the last 
classification. The first column shows the results of the SRAM 
which worked in normal mode. A high percentage of A cells 
remain classified as A cells. The percentage of B cells that 
remain classified as B is smaller than in the case of A cells. As 
was shown in Figures 5a and 5b, with 20 measurements per 
Vdd, B cells are coarserly classified than A cells. What is 
important is that a non-significant percentage of A cells 
changes to B in the last classification, and, vice versa, the 
percentage of B cells that change to A is also negligible. An 
average of 0.10% of the cells in a block that change from A to 
B (a relative percentage of 0.11% of the cells initially 
classified as A) and 0.10% of the cells that change from B to A 
(a relative percentage of 1.49% of the cells initially classified 
as B) can be considered within the noise of the classification. 
This is important to ensure that, if a registered SRAM works 
in normal mode, B cells will not be used to generate IDs or 
secret keys and A cells will not be employed to generate 
random numbers. The cells that do not remain as A or B 
usually change to C cells. 
Under accelerated aging, the percentage of A cells that 
remain A decreases and the percentage of A cells that change 
to B increases (more with high T than with high Vdd and more 
in the “worst” sets than in the “checker” or “random” sets). 
The decrease is higher in the percentage of B cells that remain 
B and the increase is higher in the percentage of B cells that 
change to A. The exceptions are the “best” sets. Under 
accelerated aging, the percentages of A that remain A and B 
that remain B are higher than in the other sets (they even 
increase with respect to the normal mode under accelerated 
aging with high Vdd). In addition, the percentages of A that 
become B and B that become A are smaller than in the other 
sets (they are even smaller than in the normal mode under 
accelerated aging with high Vdd). 
Since the proposed method allows actualizing the 
registration of the SRAM embedded in its application context, 
possible misclassifications of cells due to aging can be 
avoided. In addition, the effect of aging can be reduced if A 
cells store the opposite of their start-up values and the B cells 
store their preferred start-up values. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The method presented simultaneously improves the 
generation of identifiers, secret keys and random numbers, 
which are security primitives required by many cryptographic 
applications. The generated identifiers are more repeatable, so 
their length can be shorter and more identifiers can be 
generated from the same memory. Also, the complexity of the 
error correcting codes is reduced, and the entropy of the 
random numbers generated is improved, so that the time and 
resources to generate secret keys and random numbers are 
TABLE X 
ABSOLUTE PERCENTAGES OF CELLS CLASSIFIED AS STABLE (A) AND UNSTABLE (B) BEFORE AND AFTER AGING 
 Normal 
Accelerated aging with high Vdd Accelerated aging with high T 
Checker Random Best  Worst Checker Random Best  Worst 
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considerably smaller. The registration phase of the method can 
be repeated to improve the quality of the identifiers, secret 
keys, and random numbers generated at different operating 
conditions as well as to consider the memory aging. 
The method is easy to implement with the memory 
embedded in its application context. It does not need to be 
performed by specialized vendors or in the factory where the 
memory is manufactured. A VLSI module with low area 
overhead can be included in the digital design to further 
facilitate the implementation of the method and increase the 
security of the realization since only non-sensitive information 
is stored and/or communicated outside the digital design. 
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